EMNES Working Paper 031
The Anti-Dumping Agreement of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) determines when governments can or cannot respond to dumping. Indeed, the latter happens when a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it charges to its own home market. While this tool has been widely used by developed and developing countries, the literature on anti-dumping is rather scarce. Thus, this paper examines the impact of the anti-dumping measures initiated by the Government of Egypt on imports during the period 2001-2015. Our contribution is twofold. First, the paper distinguishes between the effect of anti-dumping measures on the value, the volume and the price of imports. Second, it differentiates between the investigation, destruction and diversion effects of anti-dumping measures. Our main findings show that, once the investigation is approved, whilst prices increase and quantities decrease, the latter is stronger than the former. Moreover, once the investigation is initiated, there is an investigation effect. This effect means that imports are likely to decrease during the investigation review period before the final decision of the WTO is announced. Second, anti-dumping measures have a significant destruction effect. This refers to imports coming from countries included in the investigation decreasing once the latter is approved. This decrease is even higher in the year following the anti-dumping duty being imposed. Finally, and as a consequence of the anti-dumping measure, a diversion effect is observed. This can be explained by the fact that the origin of imports will shift from countries targeted by the measure to those that are non-targeted.
